qrypt0 - encrypted short messages exchanged between offline computers by Bender, Andreas O.
qrypt0 - encrypted short messages
exchanged between offline computers
Andreas O. Bender
www.andreasobender.org
andreasobender@mac.com
August 26, 2018
Abstract
A system is described for exchanging encrypted short messages be-
tween computers which remain permanently isolated from any network
accessible to the attacker. The main advantage is effective protection
of these computers from malware which could circumvent the encryp-
tion. For transmission, the ciphertext is passed between isolated and
connected computers in the form of a QR code1, which is displayed on
and scanned from a screen. The security of qrypt0 therefore rests on
the cryptography and the computer’s physical isolation rather than
on the computer security of the encrypting device.
1 crypto on networked devices
Message encryption is usually carried out on networked computers. This is
hardly every questioned as a means to transmit the ciphertext from Alice to
Bob, even though it allows an attack which is not directed at the cryptogra-
phy: It is directed at the endpoints which carry out the encryption.
This is highly relevant in view of the fact that rather than attacking the
encryption, circumventing it is often much easier. Six possibilities for doing
so are listed in [1]. Four of them consist of guessing, finding or compelling
the key and locating the plaintext. Defending against these circumventions is
possible by the corresponding measures of choosing a key of sufficient entropy,
protecting the key and keeping track of all copies of the plaintext.
1”QR Code” is a registered trademark of DENSO WAVE INCORPORATED.
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The plaintext must of course be stored on the encrypting device for at
least some time. Therefore the other two possibilities of circumventing en-
cryption are hard to defend against: exploiting a flaw in the encrypting device
and accessing the plaintext when in use. In practice attackers use vulnera-
bilities of the operating system for things like the installation of keyloggers
which record the plaintext as it is typed in.
Some known examples of such attacks are recently disclosed activities in
the program Vault 7 by the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency [2].
The German Federal Intelligence Service BND has started a program to
circumvent encryption in various popular messengers [3].
Vulnerabilities which are not publicly known, so-called Zero-Days, are
traded continuously by companies like Zerodium [4]. Security patches are
released for the gaps which do become public knowledge. However, the author
is not aware of any producers of system software who are even prepared to
suggest, let alone give an assurance that there are no more such vulnerabilities
hidden in their software.
Operating systems impervious to infection by malware appear to be a
long way off [5, chpt. 8] [6, 20.6].
We need a system with the following properties:
• The exchange of encrypted messages can be protected effectively against
circumvention of the encryption. In particular, security vulnerabilities
in the operating system of the encrypting computer do not compromise
the system’s security.
• The attacker sees only the number of messages, their timing and the
ciphertext.
Relying only on currently available technology, compromises regarding con-
venience are to be expected. Even so, for high-value data a system offering
this level of security with some inconvenience is still much better than what
has been available up to now.
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2 qrypt0 on isolated devices
The distinguishing feature of qrypt0 is the isolation of the encrypting com-
puter from any open network and the transmission of the ciphertext encoded
in a QR code. This barcode is displayed on Alice’s screen and scanned into
a connected computer which sends it on to Bob.
This isolation from the network provides effective protection against re-
mote infection with malware. Keeping the isolated computer physically se-
cure is necessary to protect it from local infection with malware.
The website [7] links to a freely available prototype, which includes a
discussion of implementation issues.
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2.1 Functionality
Message encryption. The message is entered into the isolated computer by
Alice. The system adds a message number and a timestamp. The message
is authenticated, padded up to the maximum length for one barcode and
encrypted. The resulting ciphertext is encoded in a QR code.
Message transmission. An online device under Alice’s control scans in the
QR code from the screen of the isolated computer and transmits the barcode
itself or the ciphertext to the recipient by any means available.
Message decryption. An online device under Bob’s control receives the
message containing the ciphertext. If necessary, this device encodes the ci-
phertext into a QR code and displays it on screen. Bob’s isolated computer
scans in the QR code, decodes and decrypts the message, removes the pad
and checks the authentication.
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2.2 Design choices
The main cost of the system consists of one additional computer per user and
a limit on the length of the message which one QR code can contain. The
QR code has the largest capacity of 2953 bytes among common 2-dimensional
barcodes. Note that this includes the characters needed for formatting pur-
poses, for authentication, the message number and a timestamp.
Installation. In order to avoid infection with malware, the necessary
software should be installed by burning it onto an optical disk, transferring
it to the isolated machine from that medium and then checking its authen-
tication.
Cryptography. The system can be used with both asymmetric and
symmetric cryptography. Using only symmetric cryptography requires a pre-
shared key, but has the advantage of simplicity. No understanding of handling
public and private keys is required.
If asymmetric cryptography is used, key material can be entered by scan-
ning QR codes, where more than one may be required.
Formatting. In order to be sure no messages got lost, a message number
should be added. Management of messages is easier to organize if also a
timestamp is included.
Authentication. This can be done using a symmetric key for a hash-
based message authentication code. The choice of whether encryption or
authentication is done first has to be made.
Message length. We recommend padding the message up to its maximal
length, since information about the message length may be valuable to an
attacker.
Note that no information on the message is transmitted by the system
except the ciphertext itself. In particular, the file name has to be chosen
anew after passing the ciphertext between two computers by scanning in a
QR code.
System use information. Either the QR code itself or the ciphertext
it contains can be transmitted. Transmitting the QR code itself passes in-
formation on system use to an attacker.
Plaintext storage. As mentioned above, one way of circumventing en-
cryption consists of locating copies of the plaintext. As protection against
this, we recommend to do a secure erase of the plaintext messages after
display and to retain only the ciphertext on secondary storage.
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System advantages:
• The only way the system can be compromised by malware after instal-
lation is by gaining physical access to the isolated computer.
• Sidechannel attacks using timing information or measurement of power
consumption are only possible with physical access to the isolated com-
puter while the system is running.
• In case only symmetric cryptography is used, the system is easy to
handle. The key consists of a sufficiently long passphrase. Neither
management of keys on secondary storage nor an understanding of
asymmetric cryptography is necessary.
System limitations:
• One QR code can contain at most 2953 bytes, including some bytes
used for formatting. Depending on the scanning device used, the limit
can be about half that number.
• Every user needs an isolated computer.
• The isolated computer needs to be kept physically secure.
Attacks:
• Evil maid attack. Anyone who has physical access to the isolated com-
puter can install malware. Such a program can establish and use a
hidden channel in the QR code or other sidechannels like the loud-
speaker or flashing lights.
• RF emissions of the isolated machine as side channel.
• Traffic analysis. The attacker can see the number and timing of trans-
mitted messages.
• Ciphertext-only attack on the cipher itself.
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